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Does a product innovation strategy change at company headquarters resonate the same
way at different strategic business units (SBUs)? What factors play a role in differing
implementation of new innovation strategies? A collective case study was conducted at
three SBUs of an international conglomerate to investigate why the SBUs implement
the same corporate innovation charter in vastly different manners, both in strategic
processes and in organizing for new product development (NPD). This study’s con-
tribution to the literature is twofold. First, it develops initial insights into how three
SBUs implement diverse SBU-level innovation strategies in response to the same
product innovation charter. Second, it extends the findings of previous studies on NPD
strategy by presenting how three SBUs reshape their structure and resource allocation,
changing various dimensions of their innovation strategy while also fitting the com-
petitive structure in their individual, non-high-tech, traditional manufacturing indus-
tries as they respond to the corporate mandate. In this study, several factors were
observed to influence a firm when formulating a new product innovation strategy. First,
past performance and strategic typology constrain the innovation paths available. Poor
past performance limits available resources whereas the strategic typology managers
use limits their ability to recognize other opportunities. Next, capacity constraints
provide a catalyst in moving toward process improvements. Third, management in-
volvement in the day-to-day implementation of change is necessary to ensure that the
new processes are implemented. Finally, corporate performance metrics are quite in-
fluential in how SBUs adapt to change. This study identifies that even with the immense
power corporate has over these SBUs, some still dance to their own tune, ignorant of
their deviation from the corporate mandate because the metric is not sufficient to detect
these deviations. This study suggests the use of multiple types of metrics to minimize
the likelihood of nearsighted responses to innovation charter changes.
Introduction
B
usiness strategy, the pattern or plan that in-
tegrates a firm’s major objectives and action
sequences into a cohesive whole (Mintzberg
et al., 2003), has been investigated from various the-
oretical perspectives. For example, contingency theo-
ry posits that, to achieve high levels of performance,
firms must match strategies to environmental condi-
tions (Ginsberg and Venkatraman, 1985). Conse-
quently, firms need to change to adapt to their
environments because environmental conditions con-
tinuously evolve (Miles et al., 1978). In fact, de Geus
(1997) notes that one common characteristic of firms
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that endure more than a century is that they are sen-
sitive to the environment in which they operate.
Some organizations, such as the ones in this study,
tend to exhibit relatively long periods of stable strat-
egies and structures because they delay change until
absolutely necessary rather than adapting continu-
ously to the environment. Abrahamson (2004) labels
such firms as change avoiders, noting that these firms
have to undergo rapid, relentless change or face ex-
tinction. When firms delay change to this extent, pain-
ful and system-wide shifts are generally required to
survive (Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli, 1997).
Changing a product innovation strategy, which is a
subset of a firm’s overall business strategy, requires
changes in organizations’ operational modes. Howev-
er, attempts at changing organizational routines and
processes are often clouded by the firm’s prior success
or are poorly implemented (Tushman, Anderson, and
O’Reilly, 1997). Belasco (1990) metaphorically com-
pares firms being trapped by their successful pasts and
continuing to operate in the old ways to elephants
being shackled when they are young so they learn to
obey. These elephants do not break their chains when
they grow, despite having the strength to do so easily.
In organizations, Miller (1991) provides eminent ex-
amples of top managers getting ‘‘stale in the saddle,’’
who continue with the same set of strategic moves that
made them initially successful, despite driving their
current businesses to ruin in the face of a changing
competitive environment. In the new product devel-
opment (NPD) realm, some firms rigidly continue to
use the sets of values, skills, and managerial and tech-
nical systems that served them well in the past even
when these values, skills, and systems have become
inappropriate in the new environment (Leonard-Bar-
ton, 1992; March, 1991).
Based on a collective case study at three U.S.-based
strategic business units (SBUs) of a major interna-
tional manufacturing conglomerate, which is hereaf-
ter referred to as corporate, this article presents the
story of three elephants trying to break their chains
and learn to dance to the new rhythm: Despite past
success and institutionalization of the profitable hab-
its that enabled success, they must learn to grow their
business via innovation.
The core common scenario in this study is the fol-
lowing: Driven by a change in financial markets and
analysts’ expectations, the top-management team of a
conglomerate decided to abandon the strategy of
growing via mergers and acquisitions. Instead, they
advocated top-line growth through NPD as the pri-
mary key to success. They supported this strategic re-
direction via changes in the corporate product
innovation charter and encouraged increased intellec-
tual property (e.g., patents), compelling SBU manag-
ers to follow the change in the parent company’s
strategy. Subsequently, the subsidiaries attempted to
change certain dimensions of their innovation strategy
with a top-down approach to adapt to the corporate
mandate. The result is that the three divisions now
have diverse SBU-level strategies. Extant literature
describes that SBU innovation strategies can be vastly
different from the corporate innovation strategy
(Firth and Narayanan, 1996). This study extends ex-
tant knowledge by exploring how SBUs that are
adapting to a new corporate innovation strategy im-
plement diverse SBU-level strategies.
Based on contingency theory, Barczak (1995) pos-
its that a firm’s choice of new product strategy, struc-
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ture, and processes are interrelated. Moreover, the
performance of an NPD program is determined by a
firm’s innovation strategy as well as its capabilities
and organizational structure (Clark and Wheelwright,
1993). Previous studies have examined new product
strategy in high-technology industries (e.g., Barczak,
1995; McGrath, 2001; Meyer and Roberts, 1986). An-
other contribution of this study is to explore how
three SBUs change certain dimensions of their inno-
vation strategy and reshape their structure and re-
source allocation as they respond to the corporate
mandate in traditional, non-high-tech industries.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.
First, an overview of innovation strategy literature that
conditioned the observational priors of the authors is
provided, and then a clear picture of what happened in
the three SBUs examined is drawn. Next, similarities
and differences are identified between these organiza-
tions to develop some insights about why things oc-
curred the way they did. Finally, the article concludes
with managerial implications and recommendations.
Background: Drivers of NPD Program
Success and Product Innovation Strategy
Product innovation or NPD strategy, the major focus
of this study, is one of the main drivers of NPD per-
formance (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995). NPD
strategy includes the goals for the firm’s total prod-
uct development efforts; the role of new products in
relation to the firm’s overall strategy; selection and
prioritization of the customer markets, technologies,
and product categories; and a financial and human
resource deployment plan for NPD efforts (Cooper,
1993).
NPD strategy consists of two distinct components:
technology strategy and marketing strategy (Nystrom,
1985). Technology strategy identifies the manner in
which new products are developed, encompassing the
two subcomponents of technology use and technology
orientation. Technology use refers ‘‘to the way tech-
nologies are applied to the critical technical problems
in product development’’ (ibid., p. 26). When devel-
opment focuses on a given established area of tech-
nology, technology use is said to be isolated. On the
other hand, synergistic technology use occurs when
research and development (R&D) for new products
combines different technologies. Similar to technology
use, technology orientation has two dimensions: in-
ternal and external. Whereas internal technology ori-
entation refers to self-reliance by the innovating firm,
an external orientation results in the innovator utiliz-
ing technology from outside the firm while developing
new products. An externally oriented strategy would
allow for outsourcing at some NPD stages. For ex-
ample, a firm might employ a market research firm to
conduct focus groups in the concept testing phase.
Marketing strategy is composed of three subcom-
ponents: product focus, customer focus (Nystrom,
1985), and competitor focus (Urban and Hauser,
1993). If a company develops new products that are
variations of existing products, the firm is concentrat-
ing on product modification. Conversely, if new prod-
ucts offered by a firm fall outside its established
product lines, then this company’s product focus is
product diversification. Regarding customer focus,
targeting existing customers is categorized as defen-
sive whereas targeting new customers is offensive.
Competitor focus can either be reactive or proactive.
A reactive strategy is ‘‘based on dealing with situa-
tions as they occur, whereas a proactive strategy
would explicitly allocate resources to preempt unde-
sirable future events and achieve goals’’ (ibid., p. 19).
Specific reactive strategies include defensive, imitative,
second but better, and responsive, whereas proactive
strategies include research and development, market-
ing, entrepreneurial, and acquisition and alliances.
Other elements that play an integral role in the
success of a firm’s NPD program are the existence of a
formal and proficient NPD process; the way the firm
organizes for NPD; the firm’s culture and climate that
support teamwork and encourage employee genera-
tion of product ideas; reward systems (including treat-
ment of failure); and senior managers’ involvement
and communication of a clear message about the im-
portance of NPD for the firm (Cooper and Kleinsch-
midt, 1995).
This brief summary of NPD strategy captures the
factors that are used to compare and contrast the
SBUs comprising the case study sample. The next
section summarizes the research method employed,
while the following section summarizes the SBUs per
the NPD strategy dimensions just described.
Method
Collective Case Study
A collective case study method is utilized (Stake,
1995). Case-study research is advantageous when a
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‘‘how’’ or ‘‘why’’ question is being asked about a set
of events over which the investigator has no control
(Yin, 1994). Moreover, the case-study method is ap-
propriate in situations ‘‘where respondents cannot
verbalize the underlying causes of behavior reliably’’
(Bonoma, 1985, p. 202). Therefore, the case-study
method is appropriate to answer the research question
of how do different SBUs of a corporation adapt to
corporate innovation strategy change?
Site Selection
One investigator contacted the corporation’s top-
management team to request access to three SBUs
as the case-study sites. To obtain various perspectives
on the phenomenon being studied (Cresswell, 1997),
the investigators requested that the SBUs compete in
different markets. Although the specific SBU markets
differ, their products are all categorized as building
materials.
Data Collection
This study was conducted in three stages. First, to
identify the initial response state to the corporate
strategy change, two people at each subsidiary were
asked to complete a survey. The survey items are
based on Cooper (1993). The SBU key contacts, all of
whom were executive managers, chose the survey re-
spondents based on the guideline that respondents be
senior managers knowledgeable about their SBU’s in-
novation strategy. The initial mailing was followed
one month later with a reminder e-mail and follow-up
phone calls to the key contacts. Seven surveys were
returned, two from two SBUs and three from one
SBU. To limit any bias during the second stage of
data collection, the survey results were not examined
until after the second stage was completed.
In the second stage, field interviews were conducted
with employees at the three SBUs to understand how
the information and ideas flow between managers and
NPD team members and how the SBU’s senior man-
agers ensure that the NPD implementation aligns with
the SBU strategy. To enhance the understanding of
the managers’ personal experiences with the change
process and the meaning they make of that evolution
(Seidman, 1998), in-depth interviews with seven man-
agers in the three SBUs were conducted. To gain mul-
tiple perspectives, at least one participant from
marketing and one participant from the R&D or
NPD departments were interviewed. Informant titles
are listed in Table 1. As convergence of opinions from
multiple researchers enhances precision in findings
and different insights add to the richness of the data
(Eisenhardt, 1989), at least two of the investigators
were present in every interview.
Based on prior literature (Cooper, 1993; Cooper
and Kleinschmidt, 1995; Cooper, Edgett, and Klein-
schmidt, 2001; Crawford, 1980), a standard interview
protocol was developed to guide the interviews. The
open-ended questions included in the semistructured
interview protocol are listed in Table 2. The interview
protocol was semistructured in that the investigators
refrained from following it to the letter. Informants
were therefore encouraged to talk freely without feel-
ing pressure to provide the ‘‘right answers.’’ The in-
terviews lasted between one hour and one and a half
hours, were audio-recorded (unless the respondent re-
quested otherwise), and subsequently were tran-
scribed.
Once the interviews were completed, the research-
ers worked together to produce a set of combined field
notes for each SBU. The combined field notes were
based on field notes and materials gathered on site
(e.g., organization charts, lists). To develop the com-
bined field notes, each investigator first wrote an in-
dividual case note summarizing the information from
all informants at a single SBU. Then, one investigator
integrated the individual case notes from each SBU
into a combined case note. The investigators met to
finalize the combined case note document by discuss-
ing and agreeing on information to fill in gaps. Gaps
Table 1: Informant Titles
SBU1 SBU2 SBU3




Senior Vice President, Marketing
Informant 2 Senior Director of Product Development
and Engineering
Program Manager Senior Vice President, Technology
and Purchasing
Informant 3 Senior Product Manager
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and conflicts were resolved by further reviewing the
transcripts and by consultation with the SBU manag-
ers. Finally, informants reviewed the combined case
note to ensure the investigators’ comprehension of the
situations is correct. The case notes were modified
based on informants’ comments. The transcriptions
and combined case notes comprise the data analyzed
to address the research questions. The next section
reviews the analysis results.
The Response of the SBUs to the Product
Innovation Strategy Change Mandate
NPD projects should be consistent with the articulat-
ed innovation strategy (Cooper et al., 2001). To en-
sure consistency and coherence across the technology
and marketing components of a firm’s NPD strategy,
top management must link the components with the
NPD strategy to guide employees as they implement
the firm’s goals and objectives (Clark and Wheel-
wright, 1993). A product innovation charter (PIC)
serves this purpose. A PIC is a microlevel organiza-
tional concept with specific sets of organizational pol-
icies, objectives, guidelines, and restrictions
(Crawford, 1980). By unifying the elements of the
NPD strategy, the PIC guides a firm’s set of activities
aimed at developing new products and provides clear
direction. A PIC typically includes the target business
arenas, the goals of product innovation (including
quantitative metrics), the activities to achieve the
goals, the strengths to exploit, and the weaknesses
to avoid (ibid.).
In the case studies, the corporate strategy change
resulted in a mandate that the SBUs must grow via
new products. This strategy change was communicat-
ed to the SBUs via a new PIC. Moreover, the strategy
change was announced to research analysts at public
meetings and was posted on the corporate website.
The mandate requires that a specific percentage of
annual revenues be generated from products intro-
duced within a predetermined number of prior
months. The fieldwork at each SBU was conducted
approximately one year after this top-down mandate
was instituted. This section describes the changes that
occurred in the innovation strategies at each SBU.
SBU characteristics are listed in Table 3, and the in-
novation strategies of the SBUs before and after the
corporate mandate are described in Tables 4 and 5.
Finally, the organizational and NPD process changes
that were implemented are summarized in Table 6. To
ensure anonymity, the SBUs are identified by number.
SBU1
SBU1 operates in a moderately competitive environ-
ment. In fact, it does not face any U.S. competition in
its core products, where it has dominant market
shares in several segments of a fragmented market.
Recently, however, foreign firms have entered the
U.S. market and started competing on price.
Executives at SBU1 indicate that customers are
better at telling them ‘‘what they need’’ than ‘‘how the
new product should be designed.’’ SBU1’s primary
customers value products that make their job quicker
by simplifying their work because they are paid by the
job, not by the hour. Before the corporate mandate,
SBU1’s market strategy had been defensive in the
customer focus dimension and product modification
in the product focus dimension. SBU1 had an estab-
lished NPD process and had been introducing prod-
ucts with slight modifications and incremental
innovations to its existing customers. These innova-
tions even resulted in this subsidiary receiving several
innovation awards from corporate.
Table 2: Interview Protocol
1. Do you set a strategic agenda for NPD programs? If so, how is it set? Also, what are the (a) financial, (b) market, and (c) product
portfolio goals and specifically, metrics?
2. Do you guide the cross-functional teams in their NPD activities based on a strategic agenda? Are goals also set for individual
development projects?
3. How do you communicate these goals to the development teams? That is, what are the items/steps/routines followed while
communicating the goal to the NPD teams?
4. How do you make sure that the goals are communicated effectively and that the development processes are proceeding in the right
direction? That is, are there any metrics determined to monitor and control NPD projects?
5. Can you give an example where you guided the cross-functional teams in their NPD activities based on a strategic agenda for an
individual project?
6. In general, what are the strengths and weaknesses of your firm in strategic agenda setting?
7. In general, what are the strengths and weaknesses of your firm’s NPD process?
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In its NPD efforts, SBU1 exhibited isolated tech-
nology use, as the development efforts involved utili-
zation of the firm’s established technology. Finally,
this subsidiary relied solely on its own product engi-
neers for NPD activities. Therefore, SBU1 had an in-
ternal focus to product development in terms of
technology orientation.
At the time of the interviews, SBU1 was changing
its NPD process. First, three new stages were being
added to the front end of the process. This was done
to incorporate marketing input and to clearly define
the customer needs at the early stages of product de-
velopment. An executive at SBU1 described the rea-
son for change in the NPD process:
Product development didn’t have marketing input. It
wasn’t driven by what was going on in the market place;
I don’t know where the ideas came from. But, what
would happen is, engineering would start the process,
the concept development and that could go on for years.
You know, because they never had any parameters,
somebody would say we need a new [product] now. So,
they would just come up with twenty designs. So, what
we are trying to do now is let our product development
process be driven by marketing.
Another change taking place was in the subsid-
iary’s organizational structure. To fully incorporate
marketing’s input in NPD, the engineering and mar-
keting departments were integrated into a single entity.
To facilitate this integration, these two departments
were colocated. The new department was named
‘‘marketing and product development.’’ The engineers
and marketing personnel are now assigned to an NPD
Table 3: SBU Characteristics
SBU1 SBU2 SBU3
Market Share in Its Target
Segments
Dominant Nondominant Dominant
Annual Sales 4 $300 million 4$650 million Not disclosed due to confidentiality
requirements
Number of Employees 1,400 4,000
Length of Time as SBU of the
Corporate









(Customers have been asking
for new products that the
competition offers)
Compliance with corporate mandate
Maintain market dominance
Previous Change Programs Once, but small in scope
(i.e., only two departments
involved)
None None
Management Style Formal Formal Informal
Table 4: Changes in Technology Strategy Dimensions of Product Innovation Strategy
SBU1 SBU2 SBU3

























































HOW ELEPHANTS LEARN THE NEW DANCE WHEN HEADQUARTERS CHANGES THE MUSIC J PROD INNOV MANAG
2008;25:386–403
391
program and work in teams. One manager explained
this integration:
Before, we had a very traditional structure. We had
marketing and engineering departments and within en-
gineering we had product engineering, and within mar-
keting we had category management, and truly our
category managers were tied more to customer rela-
tions than to driving products or new product develop-
ment. So, we never had a chance to do market research
or other things of that nature. We had a gap in market
development vs. customer need, so most of our initia-
tives would come out from our sales force, and our sales
force being close to the customer and their perception of
‘‘Our customers need this, and this is where we think
the market may be heading.’’ We did have a product
steering committee . . .. We still maintain the product
steering committee, but what has changed is that the
marketing and product development is in one entity
within one organizational structure . . .. We no longer
have a VP of Engineering, we’ve decided to marry it
into the product development organization.
In the new organizational structure, the engineers
are grouped into sustaining and advanced engineer-
ing. While sustaining engineering improves existing
products through product modifications, advanced
engineers develop more innovative products and ex-
plore opportunities by using newer technologies. As
such, the technology use of SBU1 is synergistic. More-
over, since the advanced engineering efforts are ex-
pected to generate radical innovations, their
marketing strategy for the product focus dimension
is product diversification. The following quotation
from a senior executive expresses SBU1’s two-year
vision and explains SBU1’s aspirations for product
diversification and synergistic technology use:
We are recognized, we are the brand leaders. We have a
[a high percentage] market share. We don’t have U.S.
competition in our core products anymore. We are fac-
ing a fragmented, changing market, so we’ve got to
sustain our quality. It’s accepted, it’s a given; we don’t
get credit for it, but if we fail, we will lose what is our
biggest asset. We’ve got product development, but we
have to maintain sustaining engineering. But we’ve got
a layer in advanced engineering and innovative engi-
neering, which links with our corporate group. Those
are the people who are looking at generation Y, while
teams are driving generation X. They are filling the
bank, we may take some of our investment and throw it
out there and we may not get a return, but we won’t lose
money. But we’ve always got cash that we can pull from
and there are no gaps in the stream of innovation so
that three years from now our sales force comes back
saying, ‘‘We can’t keep up.’’
To achieve radically innovative products, SBU1’s
top managers envision using corporate’s engineering
departments in addition to its own engineers. More-
over, they collaborate with third parties in the devel-
opment process. This is a change from internal to
external in their technology orientation dimension of
innovation strategy. One senior manager explained:
Table 5: Changes in Marketing Strategy Dimensions of Product Innovation Strategy
SBU1 SBU2 SBU3
Before After (Realized) Before After (Realized) Before After (Intended)
Product Focus Modification Diversification Modification Diversification Modification Diversification
Customer Focus Defensive Offensive Defensive Defensive Defensive Offensive
Competitor Focus Reactive Proactive None Reactive Reactive Proactive
Table 6: Organizational and NPD Process Changes
SBU1 SBU2 SBU3
Organizational Change Top-management change.
Marketing and product development departments
have been integrated and colocated.
Director of manufacturing services now reporting
to VP of marketing in addition to VP of
operations.
An NPD program manager is hired.
None
NPD Process Change Three stages are added to the front end of the old
NPD process.
NPD procedures have been documented.
Time schedules for each NPD project are being
imposed.
A formal product launch procedure is being
implemented.
None
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There are certainly no resources for advanced engi-
neering. You can hardly get resources torn away long
enough to do your product engineering. So, what struc-
ture I’m putting into place? These product teams are all
focused on business settings and are dedicated teams
and their number one goal being product development.
Advanced engineering will be a way to accomplish that
. . .. We want to use [corporate] R&D to begin the ad-
vancement. So, when these product teams are finished
working on this year, they go to [corporate] R&D and
get these concepts that have already been a fair amount
of engineering done. It’s the upfront part of any design
that you can’t really put a time limit on. . . The more
time we can dedicate to that advanced engineering . . ..
We’ve got marketing issues to worry about. So, we
don’t have the luxury of having a staff of engineers. We
can’t afford that.
Finally, SBU1’s new innovation strategy embodies
a change in the customer focus component of their
marketing strategy. In their innovation efforts, they
will target not only their existing customers but also
the customers currently served by their competitors.
Furthermore, SBU1 envisions itself as being ahead of
the competitors by focusing on research and develop-
ment. This presents a change in their perspective of
competitor focus from being reactive to proactive.
While elaborating on SBU1’s five-year vision, one se-
nior manager explained SBU1’s intended shift in cus-
tomer and competitor foci:
In aggregate, 7 teams are putting out 10 products a
year, and it’s in these channels, this retail and these
customer foci, and this channel wholesale, and we are
concentrating on these local markets, and we are going
after this competitor and knocking them out, so they’re
defensive, not offensive, and we are reinventing our-
selves. Five years from now, that’s just the way we do
business.
SBU2
SBU2 faces competition from both regional and na-
tional firms. Management indicates that their custom-
ers are very sensitive to price, so SBU2 differentiates
itself via service by delivering built-to-order products
quickly. The problem with this competitive strategy is
that it results in high inventory levels and the prolif-
eration of stock keeping unit (SKU) numbers.
SBU2 was defensive in its customer focus and had
not been innovating before the corporate strategy
change. They have only been launching slight modi-
fications of their existing products. Once corporate
mandated the new innovation strategy, SBU2 adopt-
ed a fast follower strategy where they aim to develop
products that have been proven to be successful in the
industry. In effect, SBU2 has changed from not hav-
ing a customer focus to a defensive strategy. One
manager described this:
We began introducing products our competition had
already introduced, so we just caught up . . .. They were
going to be home runs. The philosophy we have devel-
oped is not to be the leading edge company. If you look
at the product life cycle curve, we want to be in the
upper one third (i.e., rapid follower).
In addition to adding modifications to their exist-
ing product lines, they are also introducing new prod-
uct lines, which represent a change in their product
focus from modification to diversification. One man-
ager described SBU2 introducing a new line:
So, finally [SBU2] could come up with something that
could be conceived as innovative . . .. This has been our
[corporate] strategy also, which really makes it very
difficult when people are putting pressure on you to in-
novate, but your whole strategy is to be a fast follower.
So, finally we can be a fast follower with those types of
items, but we can innovate in how we put it together and
how we present it.
It is worthwhile to note that despite the introduc-
tion of the new line, SBU2’s product strategy cannot
be categorized totally as product diversification be-
cause the components in this new line are modifica-
tions of existing products. The innovation, as the
manager described it, is the unique combination of
existing and modified components.
Before the corporate mandate was communicated,
SBU2 did not have a competitor focus. However, they
adapted to corporate’s new innovation strategy by
adopting a reactive competitive stance. They simply
started responding to customers’ requests accumulat-
ed at periodic meetings with major customers. In these
meetings, marketing personnel from SBU2 explain
trends to customers, inform customers of the changes
made based on the previous year’s comments, ask for
product improvement suggestions, and discuss new
product ideas. They also conduct marketing research
regarding communications (e.g., type of promotions,
sales and marketing aids). One manager described
these meetings:
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We have one each week and we have them in different
regions . . .. We invite customers based on what our re-
gional directors are recommending to us. They are the
key customers in that area and that the sales people
have a lot of confidence in and can help direct us the
right way . . .. [The customers] are starting to recom-
mend higher-level people in their organization to come
and things like that. So, they are starting to figure out
that ‘‘people are really listening to what we are telling
them at these things’’ . . .. And we go through what
we’ve done and how that was supported by what they
basically told us the last time. Then, we go through
what type of product improvements they would like to
see . . .. Then, we go into new product ideas, SKU spe-
cific items. So, whether it’s [one product] or [another
product] that we haven’t had in line because we are
really losing business if we don’t have it. Specific things
like that . . .. Then, we list all the ideas . . . and prior-
itize them . . .. We walk away from there with a [re-
gional] group of priorities . . .. We look at [regional
priorities] separately, and then look at them together
and try to figure out what the priorities should be for a
national company.
Prior to the corporate strategy change, SBU2
lacked a formal NPD process. They did not have pro-
gram management, a true fuzzy front end manage-
ment, or a formal launch procedure. For example,
they had no time schedules and launch dates. In the
meantime, the competitors of SBU2 had introduced
new products, so SBU2 fell behind. The following
quotation from a senior manager illustrates:
Up until three years ago, we introduced very little new
product here, we were known as a tired company that
was not innovative. Our competition caught up and
passed us . . .. We brought on [the program manager],
we didn’t have program managing. There was no fuzzy
front end; we just started. There was no front end de-
signing, then detailing out what had to happen, and as-
signing responsibilities and establishing a timeline and
working toward our launch date. We just worked on it
and when it was complete, it would be launched; there
was no striving toward a set date.
Since there was no formal NPD process in place
before the corporate mandate, marketing and engi-
neering departments were ‘‘throwing projects over the
wall’’ during product development. Also, the R&D
efforts for new products were mainly within the es-
tablished area of technology. Hence, technology use
was isolated. Moreover, technology orientation was
internal as they relied solely on their own employees
for NPD. To conform to the corporate mandate to
innovate, SBU2 recently initiated a formal NPD pro-
cess. However, they made no changes in their tech-
nology use and orientation but rather put more
pressure on existing human resources. One senior
manager described these changes:
When the request came to me saying that we had to hire
more engineers, I said, ‘‘You’re crazy.’’ I want these
engineers that are only working about 20 or 30% of the
time working 110% of the time. During the time of
launch, yes, they would be expected to work overtime,
when the projects are maturing. Then, they can drop
back off to normal workload when they are leading up
to that point. So, we are requiring a lot more from
them.
Finally, they made some organizational changes.
SBU2 did hire a midlevel NPD program manager to
implement the NPD process. They also created a di-
rector position to report to both the vice president
(VP) of manufacturing and the VP of marketing. This
director supervises the NPD projects, improves com-
munication between engineers and marketers, and re-
solves conflicts.
SBU3
SBU3 operates in a mature industry with several other
established firms and sells the vast majority of its
products through one retail outlet only. Contrary to
its competitors’ positioning, SBU3 has always target-
ed the premium segment. The executives indicate that
their goal is to maintain their successful performance
while continuing to operate only in the premium seg-
ment. Although they know they can pursue the broad-
er market through lower prices, they choose not to do
so. They pass opportunities that could damage their
image as a premium product manufacturer, even if the
opportunity may be financially positive in the short
run. In terms of the customer focus dimension of their
marketing strategy, they are defensive. One manager
explained:
[A competitor] will sell you five, six, seven different
levels of [product type]. So, what are they saying?
‘‘OK, well, we’ve got this high priced [product], and
only so many people will buy it, and we need it $2 lower
for somebody else and $3 lower for somebody else’’ . . ..
We haven’t done that here. Now, how long will it stay
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like this? I don’t know that, but [we’ve] resisted the
temptation.
Despite their current customer focus, they intend to
offer products that may enable them to capture addi-
tional market share and to serve new customers within
the same segment by expanding into other retail out-
lets. This expansion hinges on their R&D efforts in a
new, potentially disruptive technology, which may
yield opportunities to develop highly innovative prod-
ucts in the near future. Consequently the intended
long-term strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) of
SBU is categorized as offensive.
Although they introduced product modifications in
the past, they recently launched a merchandising in-
novation. The innovation has been successful, as it
has lowered the retailers’ costs by allowing customers
to choose products with less assistance from sales staff
while simultaneously increasing the amount of prod-
uct sold. As such, SBU3 is currently pursuing product
diversification in terms of the product focus compo-
nent of their marketing strategy.
Their competitor focus was reactive, as they would
normally counter competitors’ new products by in-
troducing a similar but higher-quality product. Cur-
rently, due to corporate’s emphasis on innovation, the
R&D department is empowered more than ever and
works on innovations that will provide a competitive
edge. SBU3 is thus becoming more proactive in com-
petitor focus.
SBU3 has a very informal and entrepreneurial cul-
ture, so they are not highly structured. One manager
described SBU3 as a ‘‘hallway company.’’ This same
manager also indicated that, because the average in-
dustry experience of the senior managers is 20–25
years, they tend to be largely intuitive in their decision
making. This intuitive style is also exhibited in their
product development approach: They have no explicit
NPD process. The following quotation is a response
to the question of ‘‘Does R&D make a formal pre-
sentation to the executive team when they identify a
new product idea?’’:
We are very informal about all this. If I want to talk to
anybody in this company, I don’t normally wait for the
meeting, I go down and talk to them . . .. I’m not trying to
be funny about it, but that’s the nature of the entrepre-
neurial culture we have. We won’t want to change that.
Even though one year has passed since corporate
communicated the new innovation goals, SBU3 has
not changed its NPD approach. The only noticeable
event was the introduction of a merchandising inno-
vation. As indicated earlier, SBU3 is exploring oppor-
tunities in new technologies that are expected to result
in new products. SBU3 expects that it will introduce
new products using the new technology or a combi-
nation of new and old technologies, so their tech-
nology use has shifted from isolated to synergistic.
They are currently working with experts outside the
firm to develop new products, as was the case for the
merchandising innovation they recently introduced.
Consequently, their technology orientation has also
shifted from sole reliance on their own R&D person-
nel to involvement of external experts.
Discussion of the Similarities and Differences
between the Cases
In the collective case study presented in this article,
despite operating under the same corporate PIC, the
SBU managers seem to have interpreted the new PIC
differently. Consequently, similar to the extant liter-
ature (e.g., Firth and Narayanan, 1996), these case-
study firms are implementing different NPD strate-
gies. This conclusion is further confirmed by the sur-
vey responses. As summarized in Table 7, the average
scores indicate that the match between corporate and
SBU innovation objectives are perceived as moder-
ately high at SBU1 and SBU3. However, the respons-
es from SBU2 point out a mismatch between
corporate’s overarching innovation strategy and the
division-level innovation strategy of SBU2.
Why would SBU1 charter into unexplored seas by
planning to develop radically new products, while
SBU2 introduced new products that merely allowed
it to catch up with its competitors? Why is SBU3
seemingly not responding to changes in the corporate
mission? There are, of course, a variety of factors that
play a role in explaining why the three SBUs inter-
preted and implemented the new strategy differently.
In this section, the observations gleaned from the in-
depth interviews are enunciated.
Observation 1: Past Performance and Strategic
Typology Drive Innovation Strategy
Firms adapt to their environment via the strategic
choices they make (Miles et al., 1978). In adapting to
the environment, firms tend to employ one of several
HOW ELEPHANTS LEARN THE NEW DANCE WHEN HEADQUARTERS CHANGES THE MUSIC J PROD INNOV MANAG
2008;25:386–403
395
unique strategies and associated tactics in approach-
ing the target market. Miles et al. (1978) label the four
strategic types as defender, analyzer, prospector, and
reactor. Three of these strategy types are exhibited by
the firms in this study (none exhibit the prospector
strategy).
Among the case-study firms, SBU3 is a defender.
Defenders stake out a market segment that allows them
to focus on a stable set of customers and products so
that they can maintain control of the organization and
operate as efficiently as possible. SBU3 targets the high
end of the market by producing only premium-priced
products that are sold primarily through a single retail-
er. The choice of which new products to develop is made
by the senior managers, while NPD is implemented via a
functional matrix structure in which a project manager
with limited authority coordinates activities and sched-
ules across different functional areas (Larson and Gob-
eli, 1988). This firm has been very successful with this
niche strategy, experiencing 30% top-line growth for the
last 20 years.
SBU1 is an analyzer in that they attempt to min-
imize risk by maintaining a stable core of products
and customers while simultaneously attempting to
maximize the opportunity for profit by introducing
multiple new products to their existing market. NPD
is implemented via a project matrix structure where
the team has responsibility for the outcome. A man-
ager at SBU1 noted:
Within the product team environment, we want them to
think of and act like a little business and make all the
right decisions for that business.
This firm also has been successful in the past. They
are recognized as brand leaders in the segments in
which they compete and they enjoy market share
dominance.
Finally, SBU2 is classified as a reactor, a firm that
exhibits inconsistent and unstable adjustments to the
environment. SBU2 differentiates itself with rapid de-
livery of built-to-order products, a strategy that re-
quires high inventory levels. In addition, they have
contractual obligations to supply certain existing
product lines for 10 years, resulting in a huge increase
in the number of SKUs they must stock. Consequent-
ly, they have high inventory carrying costs, are lacking
warehouse space to store components, and are run-
ning out of part numbers available for new products
due to system constraints. These constraints are not
only costly but also have affected SBU2’s ability to
launch new products. The inconsistent responses to
environmental change have resulted in poor perfor-
mance and reluctance to act aggressively in NPD.
Choices associated with the strategic types are de-
signed to address entrepreneurial, engineering, and
administrative types of problems (Miles et al., 1978).
In the entrepreneurial problem, firms identify their
organizational domain in terms of the product or ser-
vice industries in which they compete and the specific
markets they target. The engineering problem identi-
fies the tactics firms use to compete in their domain
and thus operationalizes the solution to the entrepre-
neurial problem. Finally, the administrative problem
involves rationalizing and stabilizing the activities
that successfully solved the entrepreneurial and engi-
neering problems. That is, firms identify and improve
on the activities at which they excel while at the same
time limiting standardization’s negative impact on in-
novation. To address this delicate balance between
efficiency and innovation, Ramanujam and Mensch
(1985) suggest that senior management should identi-
fy and communicate an innovation strategy. That is,
within the firm’s chosen domain, management should
consciously choose whether to lead or follow—whether
to dominate the target market or to maintain a smaller
share. This position, in turn, drives the innovation
strategy pursued in terms of focus (product, process,
or service) and aggressiveness (incremental to radical).
Based on their past success and their dominance of
their target market segments, leading is a realistic op-
tion for SBU1 and SBU3 because their market share
Table 7: Average Responses to Selected Survey Items
(strongly disagree5 0, strongly agree5 10) SBU1 SBU2 SBU3
Match between Corporate and SBU Innovation Objectives 7.4 4.0 6.7
Adaptiveness of NPD Strategy to Competitive Environment Changes 7.0 6.0 8.7
Use of Informal Scoring Methods to Track Innovation Projects 6.0 5.0 4.0
Have Specific Metrics to Monitor and Control Research 4.5 0.0 5.0
Have Specific Metrics to Monitor and Control NPD 8.0 6.5 4.7
Have Specific Metrics to Monitor and Control Product Launch 9.0 6.5 4.3
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dominance and profitability provides them the re-
sources to experiment with innovation. In fact, both
divisions have chosen to continue to dominate their
current markets or market niches while also pursuing
other opportunities such as introducing new products
or expanding their customer base. On the other hand,
SBU2 has chosen a follower strategy because it is less
risky to imitate the competition.
Pursuing innovation leadership fits with SBU1’s
analyzer strategy. The following quotation illustrates
that the market leadership for which they are recog-
nized comes from the quality of their products:
Our strength, and what we need to maintain as our
strength, is our ability to make quality products.
To support product quality, they assign engineers
to each product to maintain sustaining engineering
using the same processes that were used in the past. At
the same, their innovation strategy is that of product
innovations that lean toward the radical end of the
continuum, which are developed by cross-functional,
colocated teams using a Stage-Gates process. Thus,
the processes and functions of sustaining existing
products and developing new products are separated
to maintain role clarity.
Ultimately, SBU1’s innovation strategy is to devel-
op radical innovations in the form of new products
that fulfill the latent needs of their customers. The
following quote from one senior manager demon-
strates that the new products are not simple modifi-
cations of previous products:
Sometimes ideas that come from customers aren’t neat-
ly packaged. More often, I think, they’ll tell you what
the product needs to do for them versus what the prod-
uct should be. A lot of our categories are very mature
and there certainly isn’t a lot of innovation, so I don’t
expect ideas to come neatly packaged from the cus-
tomer in these categories. In the innovation, I thought
about it as more we are going to create what they don’t
know they want yet. That’s the idea.
As expected of a defender, SBU3 is moving slowly
in developing an innovation strategy. They continue
to protect their core market by continuing to develop
only premium-priced products with the same NPD
routines they have been using in the past. However,
they are aware of technology changes in the broader
environment and, at the same time, are responding to
the mandated innovation charter by focusing on rad-
ical nonproduct innovations. The first innovation
they implemented affects the purchasing process of
the end users. This successful merchandising innova-
tion helps end users visualize the final outcome of
their purchase choice, thereby minimizing the risk of
dissatisfaction.
In the longer term, SBU3 is investigating new tech-
nology that will affect raw material sourcing and their
manufacturing processes. This new technology should
result in a higher-quality product but is not likely to
exhibit new features or benefits that are radically
different from the end users’ perspective.
Finally, SBU2 reacted to their poor competitive
position and the mandated innovation charter by im-
plementing an incremental product innovation strat-
egy. Prior to the innovation charter change, SBU2
introduced very few new products and fell behind the
competition that did regularly introduce new prod-
ucts. In response to the mandated innovation charter,
SBU2 began imitating competitors’ new products.
However, this competitor-driven innovation strategy
has been problematic. Although their competitive po-
sition improved, the strategy has led to the negative
operational consequences described earlier. Ultimate-
ly, SBU2 needs to choose appropriate innovation
strategies to improve its performance.
Observation 2: Capacity Constraints Influence
Innovation Strategy toward Process Innovation in
Mature Industries
Innovation strategy is shaped by the firm’s strategic
direction as well as by the business environment. As
industries approach maturity, the focus of innovation
shifts toward process innovations (Utterback and Ab-
ernathy, 1975). Though all three subsidiaries studied
operate in mature industries, they have adopted very
divergent innovation strategies. SBU2 and SBU3 have
located themselves at opposite ends of the spectrum.
Whereas SBU2 is focusing more on process innova-
tions, management at SBU3 is investigating applica-
tion opportunities of a novel technology in hopes of
generating radically innovative products in the future.
SBU1, on the other hand, seems to have found a bal-
ance between product and process innovations in
terms of allocating its resources. They are executing
organizational changes, such as integrating R&D and
marketing, introducing a channel member position to
enhance acquisition and transfer of information on
the observed and latent needs of customers, and add-
ing new steps to their NPD process.
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Why would SBU2 focus on process innovations as
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) prescribe while
SBU3 plans to explore radical innovations, although
both are in mature industries? Ramanujam andMens-
ch (1985) suggest an explanation for the underlying
reason for the actions of SBU3: If the new technology
proves useful, then even in a mature business, superior
margins could result for those firms that are able to
initiate or quickly adopt the use of the disruptive
technology. The core competency of SBU3 has been
its R&D skills. Management now intends to leverage
this capability to generate long-term advantage
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Further, they expect to
build entry barriers when their experimentation with
the new technology results in patents (Porter, 1980).
However, the literature does not suggest any ex-
planations why SBU2 would show such a dramatic
shift toward process innovation. Based on the insights
gleaned from the interviews at SBU2, in addition to
cost pressures, there is another reason why firms in
mature industries shift towards process innovations:
capacity constraints. The following quotation sug-
gests that senior management at SBU2 deem process
innovations as a higher priority over product innova-
tions due to capacity constraints:
We have to balance, now that we have maximized ca-
pacity of our company, we have fantastic numbers, but
we have a capacity constraint. What I am working on
now is the engineering side [rather] than on the product
side. We have to build/expand plants. You reach a point
that you have to stop packing it in or your service will
be jeopardized. And it is our service that is our most
valuable asset to customers. And if that slides, we are
just the same as everyone else. We have got more into
[a product feature], things that were five years ago
unheard of to us. We introduced [same product fea-
ture] this year, and it is very successful, and we have
had to delay some projects, because we don’t have ca-
pacity.
Corporate change occurs in phases (Duck, 2001).
The determination phase, which takes place after im-
plementation, is pivotal because when implementa-
tion ends, firms often experience change fatigue,
especially if the implementation has not gone as ex-
pected. In the next stage, determination, the firm faces
the critical decision of quitting or continuing on its
change journey. If a firm shows determination to con-
tinue in this phase, it is likely to reach its change ob-
jectives. One prescription to firms in the
determination stage is to acknowledge and address
setbacks and to keep employee morale high. Having
implemented a new NPD process, SBU2 has reached
the determination phase of change. The following
quotation from one manager demonstrates that man-
agement at SBU2 acknowledges the hurdle and iden-
tifies that they need to build plants to alleviate the
capacity constraint problem and continue to change:
If it weren’t for capacity constraints and things, we
would be getting better, but we have kind of hit a wall
. . .. We have been introducing things at such a rate, and
they build parts for every product, for example, [facil-
ity name] makes [a component], which gets shared
between styles . . .. Month after month their outputs are
getting closer and closer to their limit.
Consequently, capacity constraints have tipped the
innovation strategy balance toward process innova-
tion at SBU2. SBU2 is having problems in terms of
deciding which product to develop next because even
though a project might have higher priority for cus-
tomers, it gets delayed because the resulting product
requires too many SKUs and requires system capacity
as well as storage. This is in sharp contrast to SBU1,
which does not confront capacity constraints and
therefore can allocate its resources to both product
and process innovations.
Observation 3: Change Results from Senior-
Management Involvement in Day-to-Day
Implementation
Successful innovations require product champions
(Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994). Given their
influential positions and access to external informa-
tion, senior managers often champion product ideas,
but their ability to influence successful outcomes var-
ies. Prior research suggests that senior-management
influence on product innovations is explained by sev-
eral variables, including expertise in the functional
areas of general management, marketing, R&D, pro-
duction, and even finance, with marketing expertise
dominating the effects among these functional areas
(Hoffman and Hegarty, 1993). Beyond functional ex-
pertise, the specific actions in which senior managers
engage also explain how they influence product inno-
vations (Elenkov, Judge, and Wright, 2005). In addi-
tion to their close connection to the external
environment and the power to advance initiatives
based on hierarchical position, senior managers also
influence innovation by creating and communicating
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an exciting view of the future; by selecting, rewarding,
and supporting midlevel managers; and by creating a
culture that rewards innovation.
The case studies support this prior research and
add insight into the processes through which senior
managers influence innovation. At SBU1, a new se-
nior manager was brought in to the firm to implement
process changes in NPD. This management change
seems to have triggered many of the structural and
process changes that were implemented. For example,
the new executive at SBU1 came with experience in an
industry where ‘‘customer is king’’ and therefore is
very sensitive to customer input in product develop-
ment. In fact, he says:
We want the customer in every part of the development
phase.
To improve the accuracy of information gathered
from the customer, this executive created a position in
the marketing department whose responsibility is to
be independent of the salesperson and provide contact
between the marketing department and the customers.
They deliver customer needs and ideas gathered from
the customer to the marketing department, resulting
in a greater voice of the customer in product devel-
opment and improvement of product definition accu-
racy. Getting the product definition right is one of the
keys to new product success (Cooper, 1994). More-
over, when new product concepts are generated, these
dedicated personnel get customer feedback on these
concepts in a more timely and accurate manner as well
as serve as the means to identify latent needs of cus-
tomers.
Equally important is the active role this new exec-
utive plays in the implementation of the new process.
He restructured the innovation process by combining
the marketing and engineering departments, which he
now manages. He and his top-management team are
implementing multiple information technology im-
provements to enhance communication and incorpo-
rate leading-edge systems in the NPD process.
Finally, he acknowledges that, as a newcomer, he
must work within the confines of the existing culture
as he recreates it to focus more on innovation:
I used to work at other places where we used to get rid
of top-level people and start on day two . . .. This place
is a lot more considerate of the employees and their
attitudes.
However, recreating a culture is not easy. This ex-
ecutive finds that he is getting resistance to change
because the process is so new:
This is a new process, foundation, structure. Nobody
knows what they are being asked to do. This is the first
time they are being asked to do everything.
To overcome this resistance, he finds that he needs
to implement the changes slowly by first building con-
sensus. In addition, he says his role is crucial in en-
suring managers and employees understand the
processes and implement them correctly. Doing so is
not an easy process:
I have to be in everything, I have to explain everything
to everybody. I have to explain everything to every-
body. I have to provide an example for anybody to do.
It’s just pain staking. It’s muscle driven.
At the other two firms, the senior managers imple-
menting the changes are the same managers that have
been with the firm for several years. SBU2 did hire a
midlevel engineering manager to implement the new
NPD process. Consequently, customer input is incor-
porated in NPD activities differently at SBU2. As in-
dicated earlier, this subsidiary would like to make sure
that the new products introduced are ‘‘sure to sell.’’
They do two things to ensure this. One is that they
only introduce the successful new products that were
pioneered by either sister companies or competitors.
The other is that they get customer feedback via the
regional customer meetings described previously. In
effect, the marketing department gets the customers’
blessing on every new product regardless of the NPD
stage: for new product ideas before development, for
prototypes that are about to be produced, and for the
promotions under preparation for products about to
be commercialized.
To successfully implement their NPD process, this
firm trained engineers on the new project management
software to help employees juggle multiple tasks and
projects simultaneously. Like SBU1, the senior man-
ager and the new midlevel engineering manager in-
vested considerable time and effort in explaining and
implementing the new processes, particularly the new
software brought in to manage projects and highlight
the critical path. They did so by giving step-by-step
classes and by following through with implementa-
tion:
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It is classes, it is projecting up on the screen and ev-
eryone else having their computers and following along.
And, it isn’t just: ‘‘We are going to use [this software],
good luck guys, here is your book.’’ That doesn’t work.
So, we recognized the need there, and that we had to
train people, instead of just throwing them out there.
And relentless use, just relentless . . .. No excuses, you
just do it.
In addition to training, SBU2 focused on compli-
ance with the new process rather than attempting to
build consensus as did SBU1. As the senior manager
at SBU2 indicated, in meetings where the project
timeline was discussed:
Our motto became, ‘‘You will hit the date.’’
To create compliance with the new NPD process,
this SBU also modified expectations of its engineers’
performance. In the past, engineers tended to work on
only one project that didn’t have a completion date.
Under the new NPD system, not only are there com-
pletion dates, but engineers are also expected to work
on multiple projects at the same time. Those who have
not been able to adapt have been terminated:
Four or five years ago, one engineer, one project and
you could do a pretty good job of keeping it all in your
mind. Especially, when [we] didn’t have a launch date.
It is also holding people accountable and understanding
that there will be a price to pay if you don’t do a good
job. We have terminated engineers for not being able to
adapt.
Collins (2001) likens change to pushing a heavy
flywheel constantly in a consistent direction over a
long period of time. What is seen in these SBUs is that
senior-management involvement in pushing the fly-
wheel is integral, especially in the beginning of
change, when the direction is to be set.
Observation 4: Use of a Single SBU Performance
Metric is Insufficient for Achieving Fundamental
Change in Strategy
Once the innovation strategy is set, one of the ongoing
responsibilities of senior management is to evaluate
outcomes and performance. Organizational control is
any process by which managers direct attention, mo-
tivate, and encourage organizational members to act
in desired ways to meet the firm’s objectives (Eisen-
hardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). The type of control plays
an important role in terms of evaluating performance.
Among the various types of control are structural
(also referred to as bureaucratic or behavior control),
market (Ouchi, 1979; Williamson, 1975), cultural (Ar-
vey, 1979), input (Mintzberg, 1979), and output (Jaw-
orski, 1988). For these three SBUs, corporate has
imposed only one type of control: Output control in
the form of a metric requiring that a certain percent-
age of the SBU annual revenue results from products
introduced within a predetermined number of
months. In these case studies, it is seen that this met-
ric influences the innovation strategies adopted at the
three SBUs.
Before the corporate mandate, SBU1 had been in-
troducing new products. Although they had a much
smaller-scale NPD program, they were in conformity
with the performance measure when it was first im-
posed. This head start allowed them to focus their re-
sources in transforming the processes in addition to
tackling newer product innovation and to focusing on
longer-term innovation goals. An improved NPD
process meant that they could introduce products
more quickly in the medium to long run. For exam-
ple, reduction in NPD cycle time is a major driver for
the changes made in the NPD process:
I’m giving them all these parameters so they are more
focused and they develop quickly. The previous process,
because it didn’t have a definition, just took way too long
and they were missing too many opportunities. The op-
portunity would be there when they began, but by the
time the product came out, the opportunity had changed.
In contrast to SBU1, the effect of the metric on
SBU2 and SBU3 has been different, both of which are
developing line extensions and merchandising inno-
vations to conform to the metric. When the new met-
ric was mandated, SBU2 had not been introducing
new products so they had to begin introducing new
products quickly to perform to the standard. As a re-
sult, smaller and easier-to-do projects were imple-
mented. Such projects provide lower value to firms
than do larger and more difficult projects (Cooper and
Edgett, 2003). In this study, another downside of this
‘‘picking-the-low-hanging-fruit’’ strategy is seen:
SBU2’s short-term orientation resulted in a deadlock
for new product introduction because they exhausted
the available supply of part numbers by introducing
multiple product extensions.
Conforming to the performance metrics has had a
smaller effect at SBU3, which quickly introduced
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merchandising innovations that were in the pipeline
already. However, they refrained from implementing
product extensions merely to comply with the metric.
Instead, they are exploring different technologies in a
deliberate manner.
Although requiring that new products yield a cer-
tain proportion of total firm revenues is a common
practice in firms (Cooper, 1994; Cooper and Klein-
schmidt, 1995), it appears to have mixed operational
value in SBU2. There are two remedies to alleviate the
negative consequences of the performance measures
imposed by corporate. The first is to impose a different
measure that could facilitate process as well as product
innovations. For example, McGrath and Romeri
(1994) propose ‘‘the R&D effectiveness index’’ as an
alternative. The effectiveness index computes the ratio
of increased profits from new products divided by the
investments in product development. More specifical-
ly, the index is computed as (% New Product Reve-
nue)  (Net Profit %þR&D%) (R&D%), where
the percentages are stated as a percentage of revenue.
When the index is larger than 1.0, the return from new
products is greater than the investment. In the case of
the SBUs studied, this measure seems to be a better
metric as it incorporates development costs by includ-
ing net profit in the calculation. This metric would
have encouraged SBU3 to begin executing a structured
NPD process to introduce the new products as effi-
ciently as possible.
Another solution is to impose additional output
controls or behavior controls. For example, the num-
ber of new patents acquired could encourage more
radical innovations. This, in turn, would have made it
more likely for SBU2 to adopt a longer-term perspec-
tive before rushing to market with line extensions
only. A further control mechanism would be to em-
ploy multiple time horizons for the output control.
Knowing that the consequences of not being able to
meet the shorter-term objectives would not be so un-
pleasant, SBU2 managers might have focused on
achieving longer-term goals.
Furthermore, input controls such as the number of
R&D and marketing personnel that hold membership
in professional organizations, rewarding scientists for
publishing in journals, implementing free time for en-
gineers and scientists to work on their own projects,
and awarding other innovative achievements could
have facilitated SBU2 in thinking in terms of a long-
term innovation strategy.
Finally, a metrics thermostat for NPD activities at
the corporate level would help align the innovation
objectives of corporate and SBU2. Hauser (2001) re-
fers to an adaptive control method to adjust priorities
on a firm’s chosen metrics as a metrics thermostat. By
adjusting the implicit weights, a metrics thermostat
can enable corporate to control the innovation activ-
ities of its SBUs without explicitly dictating detailed
actions to reach the desired goals.
In summary, the use of a single, standard metric for
evaluating innovation performance is not sufficient
since each SBU will be positioned differently at the
starting point of the change mandate and may go off
track just to conform to the metric.
Conclusion
Breaking established practices and old habits is diffi-
cult in organizations that need change, especially if
those practices led to successful results in the past.
Moreover, change is a cumbersome process and does
not occur smoothly even when there is a clear man-
date for change. Both of these phenomena are ob-
served in this study when investigating how three
SBUs of a corporation were responding to the or-
dered strategy change of abandoning growth via
mergers and acquisitions and adopting a growth strat-
egy via new product development. This study is
unique in that both the changes that were taking
place immediately after the mandate and medium-
to-long-term changes managers were contemplating
were observed. Consequently, after summarizing the
climate at the three SBUs before the mandate and the
changes that were being made and their vision of the
future, some common practices for enhanced success
and some practices to avoid for undesired results are
uncovered.
Two caveats of this study are noteworthy at the
outset. First, at most three managers were interviewed
at each firm for a limited amount of time. Also, reli-
ance on the perceptions and recollections of managers
about how things have happened should be noted.
However, as case studies offer the opportunity to pro-
vide valuable points of view (Bonoma, 1985), that
judgment gained from the three cases in this study
would provide useful insights for managers, especially
those who are in the midst of innovation strategy
change.
In the cases studied of firms operating in non-high-
tech, traditional industries, several factors have been
observed to influence the formulation of a new inno-
vation strategy. First, past performance and strategic
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typology constrain the innovation paths available.
Poor past performance limits available resources
while the strategic typology management uses limits
their ability to recognize other opportunities. Second,
not only are capacity constraints manifestation of
limited resources, but their salience to managers also
provides a catalyst in moving toward process im-
provements. Next, management involvement in the
day-to-day implementation of change is necessary to
ensure that the new processes are implemented. Over-
coming the ingrained and habitual nature of prior
modus operandi is tedious and time-consuming work,
especially when the existing culture leans toward con-
sensus building. Finally, corporate performance met-
rics are quite influential in how SBUs adapt to change.
Perhaps the most prominent finding of this study is to
clearly identify that even with the immense power
corporate has over these SBUs, some can still dance to
their own tune ignorant of their own deviation be-
cause the metric is not sufficient to detect these devi-
ations. Though simple metrics are useful in that they
are easy to understand, they also may result in short-
term responses that ultimately harm the firm. In this
regard, multiple types of metrics would minimize the
likelihood of nearsighted responses to innovation
charter changes.
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